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Value of Flexible Resources, Virtual Bidding, and
Self-Scheduling in Two-Settlement Electricity
Markets With Wind Generation – Part II
Jalal Kazempour, Member, IEEE, and Benjamin F. Hobbs, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In Part II of this paper, we present formulations for
three two-settlement market models: baseline cost-minimization
(Stoch-Opt); and two sequential market models in which an
independent system operator (ISO) runs real-time (RT) bal-
ancing markets after making day-ahead (DA) generating unit
commitment decisions based upon deterministic wind forecasts,
while virtual bidders arbitrage the two markets (Seq and Seq-
SS ). The latter two models differ in terms of whether some
slow-start generators can self-schedule in the DA market while
anticipating probabilities of RT prices. Models in Seq and
Seq-SS build on components of the two-settlement equilibrium
model (Stoch-MP ) defined in Part I of this paper [1]. We
then provide numerical results for all four models. A simple
single-node case illustrates the economic impacts of flexibility,
virtual bidding, and self-schedules, and is followed by a larger
case study based on the 24-node IEEE reliability test system.
Their results confirm that flexible resources, including fast-start
generators and demand response, can reduce expected costs in
a sequential two-settlement market. In addition, virtual bidders
can also improve the functioning of sequential markets. In some
circumstances, virtual bidders (together with self-scheduling by
slow-start generators) enable deterministic ISO DA markets to
obtain the least (expected) cost unit commitments.
Index Terms– Operational flexibility, wind uncertainty, equilib-
rium, day-ahead, real-time, demand response, virtual bidding.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the first of this two-paper series [1], we presented theassumptions and formulation of an equilibrium model for a
two-settlement electricity market (Stoch-MP ). In this model,
slow-start resources make commitment and tentative energy
decisions day-ahead (DA), and then real-time (RT) markets
resolve imbalances arising from inaccurate wind forecasts by
adjusting schedules of slow-start resources and committing
fast-start resources. All resources are expected profit maxi-
mizers who possess no market power and correctly anticipate
the probability distribution of RT prices when making DA
commitments. In this, the second paper of the series, we
first provide the formulations of Stoch-Opt , Seq and Seq-SS .
Stoch-Opt is a baseline model in which the expected costs
in the two-settlement market are minimized. We demonstrate
that this model is equivalent to Stoch-MP , the two-settlement
equilibrium, if players correctly anticipate the probability dis-
tribution of RT prices and behave competitively, which implies
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that a two-settlement market equilibrium is efficient under
our assumptions. Meanwhile, Seq and Seq-SS instead reflect
the present design in US markets, in which an independent
system operator (ISO) schedules DA generation against a de-
terministic wind forecast, and then runs RT imbalance markets.
In particular, PJM and CAISO use a sequential model that
includes virtual bidding (Seq). In addition, US markets also
allow generators to submit self-schedules if they prefer (Seq-
SS ), for example by offering their entire capacity at a price
equal to the bid floor (-150 $/MWh in California). Financial
players arbitrage the DA and RT markets by buying in one and
selling in the other, resulting in DA prices equaling expected
RT prices. Seq assumes the ISO schedules all generation
and, in one variant, allows virtual bidding (VB) between DA
and RT markets. Meanwhile, Seq-SS allows some slow-start
generators to self-schedule in the DA market while anticipating
the probability distribution of RT prices. Then we apply the
four models to two case studies, including an application
based on the 24-node IEEE reliability test system (RTS) [2].
The case studies are used to quantify the economic value of
adding flexible (fast-start) resources to the system to manage
wind variability. They also illustrate how VB together with
rational self-scheduling by some slow-start generators has the
potential to yield the same efficient outcomes in deterministic
DA markets (Seq-SS ) as the optimal stochastic model (Stoch-
Opt), without the ISO having to solve stochastic DA unit
commitment problems.
In the next section, we provide the formulations of Stoch-
Opt , Seq and Seq-SS , based upon the assumptions presented
in the companion paper [1], where definitions of the notation
used throughout this paper can be found. In Section III,
we present the two case studies, including a simple three
thermal unit and one wind plant example to illustrate the
basic results and an case study based upon the 24-node
IEEE RTS. Section IV presents conclusions. The appendix
describes the equilibrium conditions for the two-settlement
equilibrium (Stoch-MP ), consisting of each market party’s
first-order Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions combined
with clearing conditions for each market; these turn out to
the be same as the first-order KKT conditions of Stoch-Opt ,
proving their equivalence. The appendix also summarizes dif-
ferences between the equilibrium conditions of the sequential
market of Seq and the equilibrium conditions of Stoch-MP .
II. MARKET-CLEARING MODELS
In the following presentations of Stoch-Opt , Seq and Seq-
SS , note that all references to (1) are to the equations of Stoch-
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MP , presented in [1].
A. Stoch-Opt: Stochastic Optimization Model, Which Mini-
mizes the Total Expected System Cost
As illustrated in Fig. 3 of the companion paper [1], this
model represents a single linear optimization problem in which
the grid operator chooses all schedules in order to minimize
the total expected cost across all players in both DA and RT
markets. This problem is given by (2) below:
Minimize
ΞStoch−Opt
∑
i∈(S∪F),t
(
cDAi,t + Ci p
DA
i,t
)
+
∑
i∈(S∪F),t,s
φs Ci p
RT
i,t,s +
∑
i∈F,t,s
φs c
RT
i,t,s
+
∑
d∈(SDR∪FDR),k,t
(
C↓d,k,t d
DA↓
d,k,t − C↑d,k,t dDA↑d,k,t
)
+
∑
d∈FDR,k,t,s
φs
(
C↓d,k,t d
RT↓
d,k,t,s − C↑d,k,t dRT↑d,k,t,s
)
(2a)
subject to
(1ab)-(1ah) ∀i ∈ S (2b)
(1bb)-(1bh) ∀i ∈ F (2c)
(1cb)-(1cd) ∀i ∈ W (2d)
(1db)-(1dd) ∀d ∈ SDR (2e)
(1eb)-(1ed) ∀d ∈ FDR (2f)
(1fb) ∀f (2g)
(1gb)-(1gg), (1ha), (1hb). (2h)
The set of decision variables of problem (2), i.e., ΞStoch−Opt,
contain all variables included in problems (1a)-(1h) of Stoch-
MP . The set of constraints (2b)-(2h) include the same con-
straints as considered by the players in Stoch-MP , as well as
market clearing.
Note that Stoch-Opt is equivalent to Stoch-MP because
the KKT conditions of Stoch-Opt are identical to the com-
plementarity equilibrium problem for Stoch-MP , as described
in Appendix. This proves that the multi-player stochastic two-
settlement equilibrium model (Stoch-MP ) describes a market
that results in an economically efficient (least expected system
cost) solution under the assumptions we made. It also turns
out that in Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt , the DA market-clearing
price is equal to the expected RT price since the DA and
RT markets are arbitraged by the generators and fast demand
response (DR) providers; therefore, including separate VB has
no impact on market-clearing outcomes in those models.
We need to point out, however, that modeling simplifications
as well as computational and data limitations mean that any
real-world implementation of Stoch-Opt as a stochastic unit
commitment (e.g., [3]-[5]) would not actually achieve the
minimum expected cost solution [6]. For instance, the curse
of dimensionality means that it is not possible to consider
more than just a few of the possible actual random wind and
load realizations, nor the full multistage nature of the problem
(24 DA decision intervals, together with 288 daily 5-minute
RT intervals, not to mention the impacts on decisions in later
days). Thus, the solution to Stoch-Opt (and thus equilibrium
model in Stoch-MP ) should be, strictly speaking, viewed not
as actual social optima but more narrowly as a lower bound
to the costs that would be reported by the market models of
Seq and Seq-SS , assuming the same set of wind scenarios and
probabilities.
We also note that in the presence of market distortions,
such as feed-in tariffs, average cost-based transmission prices,
or market power, the equilibrium problem (Stoch-MP ) might
not achieve the social cost minimum, nor might it have an
equivalent single optimization problem (analogous to Stoch-
Opt). Gabriel et al. [7] discuss general conditions under
which an economic equilibrium problem posed as a com-
plementarity problem has an equivalent single optimization
problem. Incorporating such distortions, which arise from
policies and practical operating conditions, into Stoch-MP ,
Seq and Seq-SS is an important research agenda. In particular,
such models can be used to assess the efficiency impacts of
those distortions, and the benefits of market design changes to
minimize them.
B. Seq: Sequential Two-Settlement Equilibrium Model
As illustrated in Fig. 4 of the companion paper [1], this equi-
librium model contains three kinds of optimization problems:
a deterministic DA market-clearing problem, a RT market-
clearing problem for each scenario, and a profit-maximization
problem for each virtual bidder. The deterministic DA market-
clearing problem is given by (3a), whose objective is the
minimization of the cost of day-ahead generation and DR
schedules within that market subject to the deterministic wind
power forecast:
Minimize
ΞSeq,DA
∑
i∈(S∪F),t
(
cDAi,t + Ci p
DA
i,t
)
+
∑
d∈(SDR∪FDR),k,t
(
C↓d,k,t d
DA↓
d,k,t − C↑d,k,t dDA↑d,k,t
)
(3aa)
subject to
(1ab), (1ad), (1af)-(1ah) ∀i ∈ S (3ab)
(1bb) ∀i ∈ F (3ac)
(1cb), (1cd) ∀i ∈ W (3ad)
(1db)-(1dd) ∀d ∈ SDR (3ae)
(1eb) ∀d ∈ FDR (3af)
(1gb), (1gd), (1gf), (1ha). (3ag)
The optimization variable set of problem (3a), which is
ΞSeq,DA, contains all DA variables included in problems (1a)-
(1h) of Stoch-MP , except for the arbitrage quantity vDAf,t ,
which is treated as exogenous (fixed) in the operator’s DA
market-clearing problem. That is, virtual bidders are assumed
in their model to self-schedule the amount of power they buy
(sell) in the DA market, and then sell (buy) back in the RT
market.
The RT market-clearing problem for wind generation sce-
nario s is given by (3b), whose objective is to minimize the
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probability-weighted system cost in the RT market under the
scenarios considered:{
Minimize
ΞSeq,RT
∑
i∈(S∪F),t
φs Ci p
RT
i,t,s +
∑
i∈F,t
φs c
RT
i,t,s
+
∑
d∈FDR,k,t
φs
(
C↓d,k,t d
RT↓
d,k,t,s − C↑d,k,t dRT↑d,k,t,s
)
(3ba)
subject to
(1ac), (1ae) ∀i ∈ S (3bb)
(1bc)-(1bh) ∀i ∈ F (3bc)
(1cc) ∀i ∈ W (3bd)
(1ec)-(1ed) ∀d ∈ FDR (3be)
(1gc), (1ge), (1gg), (1hb)
}
∀s. (3bf)
The optimization variable set of problem (3b), i.e., ΞSeq,RT,
contains all RT variables included in problems (1a)-(1h) of
Stoch-MP , except for the arbitraged quantity vRTf,t , which is
exogenous. One important observation is that all DA market-
clearing outcomes, i.e., decision variables included in set
ΞSeq,DA, take on fixed values within (3b). Note that given the
values of the DA variables, the RT model can be decomposed
into separate RT problems for each wind realization. Finally,
the profit-maximization problem of each virtual bidder f
to be included in Seq is identical to (1f) in Stoch-MP in
[1]. The solution of Seq can be obtained by simultaneously
solving the KKT conditions corresponding to problems (1f),
(3a) and (3b), as illustrated in Fig. 1. The resulting model is
a mixed linear complementarity problem (MLCP) which we
solve using PATH.
One important observation is that Seq is not necessarily
equivalent to Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt because Seq yields a
different set of KKT conditions than those of Stoch-MP and
Stoch-Opt . Further description can be found in Appendix.
Since Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt yield the expected cost
minimization solution, this means that the solution of Seq
might be inefficient, as we illustrate in our application later.
Another important observation is that unlike Stoch-MP and
Stoch-Opt , the DA market-clearing price obtained in Seq is
not necessarily equal to the expected RT price, unless there
are arbitragers. Therefore, the virtual bidders (and the self-
scheduled slow-start generators that we introduce in Seq-SS )
can potentially help fix this price distortion. In this paper, we
numerically show how VB alone or a combination of VB and
self-scheduling by some slow-start generators can eliminate
market distortions due to deterministic DA scheduling in some
circumstances. This implies that the grid operator does not
necessarily need to do stochastic unit commitment (as in
Stoch-Opt) for the optimal solution to occur, and arbitrage
and some self-scheduling together with deterministic DA
scheduling by ISOs could accomplish this.
C. Seq-SS : Extended Seq with Self-Scheduling Slow-Start
Generators
As Fig. 5 of the companion paper [1] shows, this equi-
librium model is a collection of four kinds of optimization
Deterministic day‐ahead market‐
clearing problem (3a)   
Real‐time market‐clearing 
problem (3b) for each scenario   
Profit‐maximization problem (1f) 
for each virtual bidder  
KKT conditions of (3a)   
KKT conditions of (3b)
KKT conditions of (1f)
Equilibrium model Seq A MLCP that is equivalent to Seq
Fig. 1. Model Seq recast as a mixed linear complementarity problem (MLCP).
Deterministic day‐ahead market‐
clearing problem (4a)   
Real‐time market‐clearing 
problem (4b) for each scenario   
Profit‐maximization problem (1f) 
for each virtual bidder  
KKT conditions of (4a)   
KKT conditions of (4b)
KKT conditions of (1f)
Equilibrium model Seq‐SS A MLCP that is equivalent to Seq‐SS
Profit‐maximization problem (1a) 
for each self‐scheduling slow‐start 
generator  
KKT conditions of (1a)
Fig. 2. Model Seq-SS recast as a MLCP.
problems. These include a deterministic DA market-clearing
problem, a RT market-clearing problem for each scenario, a
profit-maximization problem for each virtual bidder, and an
expected profit-maximization problem for each self-scheduling
slow-start generator i ∈ SS . The deterministic DA market-
clearing problem is similar to (3a) in Seq , except that the
ISO respects the self-scheduling decisions of certain slow-
start generators. This market-clearing problem is given by (4a)
below, and its objective is the system cost minimization in the
DA market subject to the deterministic wind power forecast:
Minimize
ΞSeq−SS,DA
∑
i∈(S∪F),t
i/∈SS
(
cDAi,t + Ci p
DA
i,t
)
+
∑
d∈(SDR∪FDR),k,t
(
C↓d,k,t d
DA↓
d,k,t − C↑d,k,t dDA↑d,k,t
)
(4aa)
subject to
(1ab), (1ad), (1af)-(1ah) ∀i ∈ S, i /∈ SS (4ab)
(1bb) ∀i ∈ F (4ac)
(1cb), (1cd) ∀i ∈ W (4ad)
(1db)-(1dd) ∀d ∈ SDR (4ae)
(1eb) ∀d ∈ FDR (4af)
(1gb), (1gd), (1gf), (1ha). (4ag)
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The optimization variable set of problem (4a), which is
ΞSeq−SS,DA, contains all DA variables included in problems
(1a)-(1h) of Stoch-MP , except for uDAi∈SS,t, c
DA
i∈SS,t, p
DA
i∈SS,t
and vDAf,t . Note that the power dispatch decisions of self-
scheduling slow-start generators, i.e., pDAi∈SS,t, and the arbi-
trage quantity, i.e., vDAf,t , appear in power balance constraints
(1ha) within (4ag), but they are treated by the ISO as exoge-
nous (fixed) parameters.
Similar to problem (3b) in Seq , the RT market-clearing
problem in Seq-SS for wind generation scenario s is given by
(4b), whose objective is to minimize the probability-weighted
system cost in the RT market under the scenarios considered:
{
Minimize
ΞSeq−SS,RT
∑
i∈(S∪F),t
i/∈SS
φs Ci p
RT
i,t,s +
∑
i∈F,t
φs c
RT
i,t,s
+
∑
d∈FDR,k,t
φs
(
C↓d,k,t d
RT↓
d,k,t,s − C↑d,k,t dRT↑d,k,t,s
)
(4ba)
subject to
(1ac), (1ae) ∀i ∈ S, i /∈ SS (4bb)
(1bc)-(1bh) ∀i ∈ F (4bc)
(1cc) ∀i ∈ W (4bd)
(1ec)-(1ed) ∀d ∈ FDR (4be)
(1gc), (1ge), (1gg), (1hb)
}
∀s. (4bf)
The optimization variable set of problem (4b), i.e.,
ΞSeq−SS,RT, contains all RT variables included in problems
(1a)-(1h) of Stoch-MP , except for pRTi∈SS,t,s and v
RT
f,t , which
are exogenous. Similar to Seq , all DA market-clearing out-
comes, i.e., decision variables included in set ΞSeq−SS,DA, are
fixed values within (4b). In addition, similar to Seq , the RT
model can be decomposed into separate RT problems for each
wind realization given the values of the DA variables.
The profit-maximization problem of each virtual bidder f
to be included in Seq-SS is identical to (1f) in Stoch-MP .
Finally, the expected profit-maximization problem for each
self-scheduling slow-start generator is identical to problem
(1a) in Stoch-MP , but only for each i ∈ SS.
We obtain the solution of Seq-SS by simultaneously solving
the KKT conditions corresponding to problems (1a) specifi-
cally for ∀i ∈ SS, (1f), (4a) and (4b), as illustrated in in Fig.
2. The resulting model is a MLCP.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides numerical results for a simple illus-
trative example and a larger case study based on the 24-
node IEEE RTS [2]. The two systems are used to highlight
the relationships among the four models; in particular, that
the stochastic equilibrium market (Stoch-MP ) yields the cost
minimizing solution of Stoch-Opt , which might be viewed
as an ISO that runs a stochastic unit commitment model.
Meanwhile, Seq (in which the ISO runs a deterministic DA
market model, followed by RT markets) is shown to be, in
TABLE I
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
DISPATCHABLE GENERATORS
Unit Type P i [MW] P i [MW] R
D
i [MW/h] R
U
i [MW/h] Ci [$/MWh] C
SU
i [$]
G1 Slow-start 1000 1000 1000 1000 40 15,000
G2 Slow-start 0 1000 1000 1000 60 10,000
G3 Fast-start 0 500 500 500 120 1000
TABLE II
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: RESULTS
Stoch-MP Seq Seq Seq-SS
and Stoch-Opt (without VB) (with VB) (with VB)
(with/without VB)
DA schedule [MW]
G1 500 (0.5)∗ 750 (0.75) 1000 (1.0) 500 (0.5)
G2 250 (0.5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0.5)
G3 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
WP 250 250 250 250
VB - - -250 +250
G1 0 0 0 0
RT operation G2 +250 0 0 +500
under scenario s1 G3 0 (0) 250 (0.5) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[MW] WP -250 -250 -250 -250
VB - - +250 -250
G1 0 0 0 0
RT operation G2 -250 0 0 0
under scenario s2 G3 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
[MW] WP +250 0 -250 +250
VB - - +250 -250
Expected wind
0 125 250 0
curtailment [MW]
DA 55 55 [55,61] 55
Prices [$/MWh] RT (s1) [60,110]† 122 [110,122] [55,110]
RT (s2) [0,50] 0 [-12,0] [0,55]
Total expected
47,500 56,500 55,000 47,500
system cost [$]
∗ The value inside parentheses indicates the (relaxed) commitment status.
† The square brackets indicate the range of possible prices consistent with the solution.
general, inefficient, although virtual bidders and a few self-
scheduled slow-start generators can eliminate that inefficiency
(Seq-SS ). In addition, the RTS-based case study shows how
the models can be used to calculate the expected economic
value of adding flexible resources to the system that can
manage unforecast wind variations.
In all case studies, the main criterion for comparing the
performance of the market models is the total expected system
cost, i.e., system cost in DA plus the probability-weighted
system cost in RT. The total expected system cost in each
model is calculated using the optimal or equilibrium solution
achieved, and its formulation is identical to objective function
(2a) in Stoch-Opt .
A. Simple Illustration of Relationships Among the Models
A single-hour two-settlement market is considered in this
illustrative example. The market includes two slow-start gener-
ators (G1 and G2), a fast-start generator (G3), a wind generator
(WP), a virtual bidder, and a single load, all located at a
single node. For simplicity, demand-side flexible resources
are not considered; however, they are modeled in the RTS-
based case study of the next subsection. Table I gives the
technical characteristics of the dispatchable generators. The
initial commitment status of all dispatchable generators is set
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to zero, so that start-up costs need to be incurred if a generator
is to be dispatched. The wind power forecast in DA market
is 250 MW, while its actual RT realization is uncertain. This
uncertainty is modeled via two equiprobable scenarios (s1 and
s2), in which the wind production is 0 MW and 500 MW,
respectively. Finally, the system load is 1000 MW.
Table II provides the results for the four models. The values
within parentheses give the (relaxed) commitment status of
dispatchable generators in the DA market and the adjusted
commitment for fast-start generator in RT market. As we
mentioned above, VB has no impact on market-clearing out-
comes in Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt (column 2 of Table II)
since DA and RT markets are arbitraged. However, VB alters
the outcomes of sequential two-settlement market in Seq and
Seq-SS (columns 3 to 5). Note that despite the large wind
uncertainty, there is sufficient flexible capacity to ensure that
there is never any unserved load, although wind is curtailed
in the suboptimal (Seq) solutions.
In Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt (column 2 of Table II), which
provide the ideal (expected cost-minimizing) solution, the
slow-start generation sources G1 and G2 as well as WP supply
the load while the fast-start generator G3 is off. All generators
know the probability distribution of RT prices. This allows
G2 to efficiently manage the wind forecast error in RT by
committing half of its capacity.1 This slow-start generation
fully compensates for the 250 MW wind power shortfall
(relative to the forecast) under scenario s1, while reducing its
own production under scenario s2 due to 250 MW of excess
wind power. The expected wind power curtailment is zero, and
the costly fast-start generator G3 is never called upon.
Turning to the prices in the efficient solutions (Stoch-
MP and Stoch-Opt), we see that the DA price is unique,
and equals the marginal cost of generator G1 covering its
production and start-up costs. Unlike the DA price, the RT
prices under both scenarios are non-unique due to degeneracy.
The RT price under scenario s1 lies between $60/MWh and
$110/MWh. The lower price bound, i.e., $60/MWh, is indeed
the G2’s offer price (production cost) in case a marginal de-
crease in production level is needed. Similarly, the higher price
bound should be determined based on the cost incurred by a
marginal increase in production level, which is $122/MWh
(G3’s offer price covering its production and start-up costs).
However, this bound cannot exceed $110/MWh. The reason,
as discussed in the companion paper [1], is that in Stoch-MP
and Stoch-Opt (and also in Seq with VB, and Seq-SS ) the
expected RT price should be equal to the DA price. Since DA
price is $55/MWh, and the lowest RT price under scenario
s2 is 0, the maximum possible RT price under scenario s1 is
$110/MWh. Likewise, the RT price under scenario s2 varies
between 0 and $50/MWh. This price multiplicity implies that
a choice of RT price for one scenario will determine the price
1This might be viewed as an approximation of a large system in which there
are multiple generators of each type, and the fraction committed represents
the proportion of those generators that are scheduled DA to be on-line. The
generator’s decision to commit only a proportion of the capacity represents a
compromise between saving commitment costs and the reduced flexibility that
results from having only half of the ramping capability available to cope with
net load uncertainty. This diminished rampability is appropriately reflected in
the constraints in (1a).
uniquely for the other. An example of feasible selection of
RT prices is $80/MWh for scenario s1 and $30/MWh for s2,
since their expected value equals $55/MWh. The appropriate
selection of prices in cases with such a degeneracy condition is
outside the scope of this paper. However, the interested reader
is referred to [8] and [9].2
In Seq without VB (column 3 of Table II), the DA mar-
ket is first cleared against a deterministic net load forecast,
which results in scheduling the least-cost generators, i.e.,
WP and G1. Then, in the sequential market-clearing process,
the DA schedules are fixed boundary conditions for the RT
market-clearing problem. Thus, the slow-start generator G2
is unavailable in the RT market, since it was not committed
in DA market. Therefore, unlike Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt ,
the wind power deficit under scenario s1 is made up by
starting up the most expensive generator, i.e., the fast-start
unit G3. In addition, the excess wind power under scenario
s2 is curtailed since G1, once committed, does not have the
capability to be turned down. In this case, the DA and the
expected RT prices are unique but not identical. The total
expected system cost increases in this case to $56,500, which
is 18.9% higher than that in Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt . The
reason for this increase is that all players, especially slow-start
generator G2, are naive in the sense that they are dispatched
deterministically in DA based on the forecast in that market
without consideration of the value of flexibility in the RT
market. However, the two solutions discussed next show how
the participation of some market players who anticipate the
probability distribution of RT prices can induce more efficient
market-clearing solutions, even though the DA and RT markets
are still cleared sequentially.
In the first of these two solutions (column 4 of Table II),
the virtual bidder participates in the sequential DA-RT markets
of Seq . In equilibrium, the bidder buys 250 MW in DA and
sells it back in RT. This arbitrage action has the beneficial
effect of avoiding use of the expensive fast-start generator G3
in RT under scenario s1. However, compared to Seq without
VB, the arbitrage action causes wind power to be curtailed
and price to fall to zero in the RT market under scenario s2.
Overall, VB decreases the expected system cost from $56,500
(Seq without VB) to $55,000 (Seq with VB), but the latter
cost still exceeds the ideal solution ($47,500 in Stoch-MP and
Stoch-Opt). Thus, VB has improved market efficiency, but the
resulting solution is still more costly than optimal. Note that
in this case, just like Seq without VB, the slow-start generator
G2 is not started up in DA and therefore is unavailable to the
RT market.
Exploring the prices in Seq further, we see that the markets
have multiple price equilibria, but subject to the constraint
that DA and expected RT price differences being arbitraged
to zero. An example of feasible market prices in this case is
$55/MWh (DA), $110/MWh (RT under scenario s1) and 0 (RT
under scenario s2). We also see that if the markets allow for
negative RT prices (which is the case in US markets, where
2In [10], it is pointed out that such degeneracy can usually be gotten rid of
if a small amount of price-responsive demand is represented as a continuous
demand function.
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Fig. 3. IEEE RTS case study: Total load in different hours
price floors are negative), then it is possible for equilibrium
RT prices in s2 be negative.
In Seq-SS , which is the second of the two solutions with
more participants in the successive markets (last column of
Table II), one of the slow-start generators (G2) is allowed
to self-schedule. A combination of VB and self-scheduling
by G2 results in the most efficient solution (yielding the
same expected system cost as for Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt),
even though the ISO clears the DA market without explicitly
considering the need for flexibility in the RT market. In Stoch-
MP , Stoch-Opt and Seq-SS , generator G2 is committed in
DA, generator G3 is off, and neither load nor wind power is
curtailed.
One question is: how might the self-scheduling of G2 come
about? The answer is that G2 would find it profitable, given
the prices that would otherwise occur. For instance, consider
the prices observed in the solutions of Seq without VB: if
the profit-maximizing owner of G2 anticipated the RT prices
resulting in that solution, it would find it profitable to self-
commit in the DA market, even if it does not sell any DA
power. Such self-commitment would make G2 available in
scenario s1 to generate under the high prices that prevail under
that net load realization. If G2 is price-taking, it would then
expand its DA commitment to half of its capacity, at which
point additional commitment would no longer have a positive
profit. Similarly, if the DA price in Seq (with VB) is over
$55/MWh, G2 would profitably increase its self-commitment,
which would then drive down price to $55/MWh (when self-
commitment reaches 0.5), at which point it would commit no
additional capacity.3
These same relationships among the models are shown in
the next set of case studies, and in addition we show how
the model can quantify the economic value of introducing
additional flexible resources.
3The presence of transmission constraints, which result in unequal LMPs
at different locations whose differences will depend on which constraints
bind, will make characterization of probability distributions of RT LMPs
more challenging for self-scheduling generators. However, we do note that
variations among LMPs within a subregion of a market (such as the Bay
Area of California) are much less than variations over time (offpeak vs peak)
[11], and that power marketers do carefully analyze and characterize those
distributions.
TABLE III
IEEE RTS CASE STUDY: TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
DISPATCHABLE GENERATORS
Unit P i P i R
D
i R
U
i Ci C
SU
i Initial dispatch [MW]
(i) [MW] [MW] [MW/h] [MW/h] [$/MWh] [$] (initial commitment)
G1 10 40 10 10 11.09 17,462 40 (1)
G2 12 152 30 30 16.60 13,207 0 (0)
G3 10 40 10 10 11.09 17,462 40 (1)
G4 12 152 30 30 16.60 13,207 0 (0)
G5 75 300 105 105 18.52 22,313 0 (0)
G6 100 591 130 130 19.10 28,272 0 (0)
G7 0 60 60 60 22.41 10,721 0 (0)
G8 80 155 100 100 14.08 21,450 100 (1)
G9 80 155 100 100 14.08 21,450 0 (0)
G10 400 400 400 400 10.17 90,000 400 (1)
G11 400 400 400 400 10.17 90,000 400 (1)
G12 40 300 150 150 17.80 10,000 0 (0)
G13 160 310 200 200 14.08 42,900 200 (1)
G14 220 350 40 40 10.46 33,921 350 (1)
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Fig. 4. IEEE RTS case study: DA and expected RT wind power forecasts
(upper plot), and five scenarios in RT (lower plot)
B. IEEE RTS Case Studies
In this section, we analyze the value of various flexible
resources, i.e., fast-start peaking units, slow and fast DR
providers, and also VB using several cases based on the 24-
node IEEE reliability test system [2].
We consider a daily time horizon (24 hours). The original
system in [2] contains 14 dispatchable generators (G1 to G14),
17 loads (D1 to D17) and 34 transmission lines. The data for
dispatchable generators are provided in Table III. The total
installed capacity of dispatchable generators is 3405 MW.
Which generators belong to which category (slow-start or fast-
start) is defined below, and depends upon the specific case
considered. The aggregate load profile is depicted in Fig. 3.
The shape of this load profile is consistent with the load in
PJM on June 25, 2015 [12]. The total load in peak hour 16 is
equal to that assumed in [2] raised by 5%., i.e., 2,992.5 MW.
The total load is distributed among different nodes as in [2].
The costs of load shedding for all loads are assumed to be
identical, i.e., $300/MWh.
In addition to dispatchable generators in the original paper
[2], we add a wind farm at node 15, whose RT production
uncertainty is represented by five equiprobable scenarios. The
upper plot of Fig. 4 depicts the DA and the expected RT
forecasts of wind power production, while the lower plot
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illustrates the five wind power scenarios in RT. During hours
1 to 9, the wind power forecast in DA is comparatively lower
than the expected one in RT, while it is higher during the
rest of hours. The wind power penetration, i.e., the level of
expected wind power divided by total load, is 15.4% based on
the DA forecast, while it is 11.4% based on the expected RT
realizations. Thus, the expected wind forecast error is 4% as
a fraction of total load. Introducing this “bias” into the wind
forecasts makes the analysis more interesting by illustrating
the impact of systematic ISO forecast error, and the economic
value of flexibility and VB.
This DA forecast bias does not affect the solution of
stochastic models, i.e., Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt , because
the correct distribution of RT realizations is considered at the
DA stage. However, such a bias can affect the solutions from
sequential models (Seq and Seq-SS ) since the ISO considers
only the (biased) DA forecast when it clears the DA market,
although virtual bidders and some generators recognize the
full range of possible RT outcomes when developing their
offers. Figs. 6 and 7 in the companion paper [1] illustrate
the decision sequence in different models and indicate when
each information is revealed. We acknowledge that the value of
flexibility and VB to the market could be less in case the ISO
forecast is instead unbiased, i.e., DA forecasts and expected
RT wind are identical.
We augment the original RTS by adding DR providers. They
are defined as loads D5, D8, D9, D13 and D16. The first three
provide slow DR, while D13 and D16 are fast DR providers.
We define two tranches (or “blocks”) of adjustments for each
DR provider. Each block for each DR provider represents an
adjustment of 1% of its hourly load. The DR bidding curves of
DR providers in DA and RT are schematically depicted in Fig.
5. We consider identical bid prices for upward DR in the DA
market (provided by all slow and fast DR providers) and in
RT (provided by only fast DR providers). More sophisticated
assumptions are possible (e.g., feasible adjustments in RT
might be less than DA). Each slow/fast DR provider bids the
first and second upward DR blocks at prices of $15/MWh
and $10/MWh, respectively. These represent the willingness
to pay for additional power consumption. Meanwhile, each
slow/fast DR provider offers the first and second downward
DR blocks in DA market at prices $60/MWh and $70/MWh,
respectively. However, each fast DR provider offers the same
blocks but in RT at comparatively higher price, i.e., $80/MWh
and $100/MWh. These prices represent the willingness to
accept compensation in return for reducing load.
We consider the following four cases:
• Case 1: All dispatchable generators (G1 to G14) are
slow-start, and DR resources are unavailable.
• Case 2: This case is similar to Case 1, but G7 is a fast-
start dispatchable generator.
• Case 3: This case is the same as Case 2, but G5 is also
a fast-start dispatchable generator.
• Case 4: This case is identical to Case 3, except that DR
resources are also available.
Case 1 refers to a highly inflexible market without any
flexible resource. Compared to Case 1, Case 2 is comparatively
flexible, since we consider generator G7 with relatively small
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Fig. 5. IEEE RTS case study: DR bidding curves of DR providers in DA
and RT
TABLE IV
IEEE RTS CASE STUDY: RESULTS OBTAINED FOR Stoch -MP , Stoch -Opt
AND Seq WITHOUT VIRTUAL BIDDING
Case Outcome
Stoch-MP
Seq
and Stoch-Opt
Case 1
Total expected system cost [$] 740,091 1,487,869
Total expected curtailed load [MW] 0 2,712.3
Average DA price [$/MWh] 19.74 20.12
Average expected RT price [$/MWh] 19.74 178.72
Case 2
Total expected system cost [$] 739,249 1,291,546
Total expected curtailed load [MW] 0 1,965.8
Average DA price [$/MWh] 19.78 20.12
Average expected RT price [$/MWh] 19.78 160.29
Case 3
Total expected system cost [$] 737,791 762,277
Total expected curtailed load [MW] 0 58.1
Average DA price [$/MWh] 19.78 20.12
Average expected RT price [$/MWh] 19.78 29.81
Case 4
Total expected system cost [$] 685,143 748,049
Total expected curtailed load [MW] 0 0
Average DA price [$/MWh] 19.87 20.05
Average expected RT price [$/MWh] 19.87 22.84
capacity (60 MW) as a fast-start unit. The market becomes
more flexible in Case 3 in which the relatively large generator
G5 with the capacity of 300 MW is considered as a fast-start
unit too. Case 4 is the most flexible case, in which both slow
and fast DR resources are also available.
We start by first excluding the virtual bidders, and solve
Stoch-MP , Stoch-Opt and Seq for all four cases. The results
obtained are presented in Table IV. Note that the “average DA
price” reported in Table IV is obtained averaging all nodal DA
prices across all hours.
Similarly, the “average expected RT price” is achieved
based on the expected RT prices at all nodes across all
hours. As expected, Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt (stochastic
equilibrium and expected cost minimization/ISO stochastic
optimization) yield the same market outcomes, while those of
Seq (sequential ISO-based market clearing using deterministic
unit commitment DA) are different and less efficient. Also as
expected, the total expected system cost decreases as the flex-
ible resources increase.4 The cost savings can be considered
the economic value of additional flexibility.
Surprisingly, the value of flexibility can be vastly different
4Note that cost cannot increase because making a resource flexible by
allowing start-ups in RT increases the size of the feasible region.
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Fig. 6. IEEE RTS case study: Total virtual power traded in DA across different
hours in Case 1
depending on the market design. In particular, the system cost
reduction is larger in inefficient Seq than in the cost-optimal
models. For example, a comparison of Cases 1 and 2 implies
that making G7 a fast-start generator reduces costs slightly in
Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt ($842), which corresponds to about
$22.61/MWh for each MWh of expected production from G7.
Meanwhile, the decrease resulting from making G7 flexible in
Seq is orders of magnitude larger ($196,323). This reason for
this huge cost reduction in the latter case is that the inefficient
model yields a costly loss of load. Its expected curtailed load
across the daily horizon is reduced from 2,712.3 MW in Case
1 to 1,965.8 in Case 2. This change is even greater in Case 3
in which G5 is also considered as a fast-start unit.
Examining the prices, we see that, as expected, the DA and
the expected RT prices are identical in Stoch-MP and Stoch-
Opt across all cases. However, DA and RT prices are not
arbitraged in Seq , with the average expected RT price being
much higher than that in DA due to RT load curtailments. This
DA-RT price gap reduces in Seq as more flexible resources
become available. For example, in the most flexible case, i.e.,
Case 4, load curtailments are eliminated and the price gap is
only $2.79/MWh. However, the expected system cost of Seq
still exceeds that in Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt due to less
efficient utilization of generators and DR providers in Seq .
We then introduce virtual bidders at every node to Seq for
all four cases. Note that VB would not change the results
of Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt . As discussed in the companion
paper [1], we assume that all virtual bidders in DA have perfect
knowledge of the distribution of RT prices. Remarkably, such
virtual bidders are sufficient to make Seq’s results converge to
the expected cost minimization outcomes of Stoch-MP and
Stoch-Opt , i.e., the third column of Table IV. This means that
in these particular cases, virtual bidders by themselves lead the
deterministic day-ahead market to choose the most efficient
unit commitment. In contrast, in the simple illustration of the
previous subsection, self-scheduling by a profit-maximizing
slow-start generator was also needed. We consider Case 1
to explore why this occurred. In Seq without VB, there are
out-of-merit dispatches in DA due to ramping constraints of
dispatchable generators. For example, those constraints force
the ISO to commit generator G9 despite its comparatively high
start-up cost, while generators G2 and G4 with lower start-up
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Fig. 7. IEEE RTS case study: DA schedule of generator G6 (without
enforcing ramping constraints in DA) in Stoch-MP , Stoch-Opt , Seq with
VB, and Seq-SS with VB while generator G6 self-schedules
costs are kept off. But in the same model with VB, virtual
trading alters the net DA load in each hour and consequently
changes the DA dispatch so that G9 is constrained off, whereas
G2 and G4 are dispatched. The total virtual power traded
in DA market across different hours is illustrated in Fig. 6.
Virtual bidders sell energy in DA during hours 1 to 9, when
the DA wind forecast is lower than the expected RT forecast
(upper plot of Fig. 4), and buy back the power in RT. Then
in the rest of the hours, VBs buy power in the DA market
and sell back in RT to compensate for DA overforecasts of
wind output. In these cases, Seq-SS , with the inclusion of
self-scheduling slow-start generators, is unneeded to achieve
the efficient solution; VB suffices.
To analyze a case with less out-of-merit order dispatch in
DA market, we relax the ramping constraints of dispatchable
generators in DA (while still enforcing them in RT) and solve
Case 1 considering the three different models. Thus, the DA
model in Seq is inaccurate not only because it ignores the
need for flexibility in RT but also because it omits important
generator limitations. The results obtained are presented in
Table V. The total expected system cost in Stoch-MP and
Stoch-Opt is identical to that in Table IV with ramping
constraints in DA. However, the DA schedules can be different,
which indicates the optimal schedule is not unique. But unlike
Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt , the DA ramping constraints were
active in Seq (without VB), because the expected system
cost is increased from $1.48 million (Table IV) to $1.96
million (Table V). The reason for this increase is that the
DA dispatches without ramping constraints in the sequential
two-settlement system are more inefficient, in the sense that
they increase the magnitude of infeasibility in RT that the
operator needs to try to correct, resulting in greater RT load
curtailment. However, the inclusion of VB in Seq reduces
expected system costs significantly, but now they remain
slightly higher than costs in Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt . This
confirms the conclusion of the simple example (Section III.A)
that VBs alone may not lead a deterministic DA market to
choose the most efficient resource commitment. A comparison
of the schedules of Stoch-MP , Stoch-Opt and Seq (with VB)
indicates that the DA position of some slow-start generators,
especially G6 (see Fig. 7), in Seq is still inefficient. According
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TABLE V
IEEE RTS CASE STUDY: RESULTS IN CASE 1 WITHOUT ENFORCING RAMPING CONSTRAINTS IN DA
Outcome
Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt Seq Seq Seq-SS
(with/without VB) (without VB) (with VB) (with VB; generator G6 self-schedules)
Total expected system cost [$] 740,091 1,962,780 751,579 740,519
Total expected curtailed load [MW] 0 4,406.1 10.1 0
TABLE VI
IEEE RTS CASE STUDY WITH INCREASED WIND PENETRATION: RESULTS IN CASE 1 WITHOUT ENFORCING RAMPING CONSTRAINTS IN DA
Wind power penetration∗ based on
Outcome
Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt Seq Seq Seq-SS
DA and expected RT forecasts (with/without VB) (without VB) (with VB) (with VB; generator G6 self-schedules)
30.8% (DA), 22.8% (RT)
Total expected system cost [$] 623,947 2,359,824 644,046 624,845
Total expected curtailed load [MW] 0 6,260.8 9.2 0
∗ The wind power penetration refers to the level of (expected) wind power forecast divided by total load.
to Fig. 7, generator G6 in Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt (ideal
solution) is fully dispatched in hours 12 to 21, and its expected
profit is $2139. However, in Seq with VB, its hourly DA
schedule is often lower than that in the ideal solution. In
addition, G6 incurs significant start-up costs in hours 11 and
22. This naive DA schedule of G6 considerably reduces its
expected profit to -$18,000. If G6 is aware of this expected
loss, it would prefer to self-schedule, as in Seq-SS , because
it could eliminate its entire expected loss (earning zero profit
in Seq-SS ), while lowering overall system costs. However, its
earnings are still lower than what it would earn in the fully
efficient market ($2139 in Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt), where
market efficiency is also better. This example demonstrates that
virtual bidders plus self-scheduling by one slow-start generator
can help improve market efficiency when the ISO uses a
deterministic DA scheduler, but is not sufficient to achieve
full optimality.
C. IEEE RTS Case Study with Increased Wind Penetration
In this section, we analyze the impact of increased wind
power penetration on performance of the four models. This is
motivated by European power systems with high wind pen-
etration, such as Denmark and Germany. Such systems have
been the focus of other work on market-clearing mechanisms.
For instance, [13] addresses the limitations of the current
sequential market-clearing system in Germany in terms of cop-
ing with high variable renewable penetration. Likewise, [14]
examines the role of support payments to flexible resources
in changing the DA dispatch in Germany in order to back up
variable renewable output.
We build upon the last version of Case 1 from Section III.B,
in which we relaxed the ramping constraints of dispatchable
generators in DA while enforcing them in RT (Table V). In
particular, we consider a high wind case (Table VI). This case
has double the amount of DA wind forecast (from 15.4% in
Section III.B to 30.8%) as well as double the wind in each RT
scenario (wind power penetration based on expected RT output
is 22.8%, rather than the 11.4% in Section III.B). Accordingly,
the DA wind forecast bias is 8% of the total load while it was
4% in Table V of Section III.B.
Note that the hourly patterns of wind power scenarios are
identical to that in Fig. 4 of Section III.B, but their magnitude
is scaled up in proportion to the overall increase in wind MWh.
The capacity of transmission lines is raised by 15% to facilitate
higher wind integration.
The results obtained are given in the second row of Table VI,
whose structure is identical to that of Table V in Section III.B.
In this case with increased wind penetration (and increased
forecast error), the total expected system cost in Seq (with
VB) and Seq-SS is 3.22% and 0.13% higher than that in
the ideal solution (Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt), respectively.
In comparison, those two values in Section III.B (Table V)
were roughly half as large (1.55% and 0.06%, respectively).
However, these inefficiencies are much less than what occurs
in the absence of VB and self-scheduling, in which case the
costs are several times larger than the efficient cost level.
This example demonstrates that VB and self-scheduling can
still greatly enhance market efficiency when the ISO uses a
deterministic DA scheduler, but that the remaining inefficiency
can increase with the amount of wind penetration.
One interesting observation is that the results given in Table
VI, except for Seq (without VB), are unchanged across the
two cases with the same RT wind realizations but with a
lower degree of bias in the DA forecast (either 4% and 0%
overforecast, instead of the value 8% in Table VI, i.e, the
forecast DA wind penetration in these two cases is 26.8% and
22.8%, respectively). Note that the case with 0% DA forecast
bias still has some bias in some hours, since the daily pattern
of DA and expected RT forecasts is different. The reason for
achieving the same results (except for Seq without VB) in this
specific example is that the perfect VB adapts itself to this bias
and eliminates it.
D. Computational Performance
The linear optimization problem in Stoch-Opt and the
sequential linear optimization problems in Seq (without VB)
are solved using CPLEX under GAMS. In addition, the
MLCPs for models Stoch-MP , Seq (with VB) and Seq-SS
are solved using PATH under GAMS. We solve all problems
on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-1650 with 12 processors clocking
at 3.50 GHz and 32 GB of RAM. The maximum number of
variables occurs in model Seq-SS , which is 27,456 in the cases
reported in Sections III.B and III.C. The CPU time for linear
problems in Sections III.B and III.C is a few seconds, while
it is about 4-7 minutes for the MLCPs.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Our four models and their computational applications show
that deterministic day-ahead scheduling by ISOs can result in
large inefficiencies that, however, can be largely or entirely
overcome by financial arbitragers (virtual bidding) together
with some self-scheduling by large slow-start conventional
generators.
Therefore, it is possible that a subset of market parties acting
on high quality stochastic information can help the market
achieve the same efficiencies as central stochastic clearing by
the ISO. Hence, in spite of the theoretical appeal of having
an ISO use stochastic unit commitment to clear the market,
the practical and political difficulties of that approach together
with the efficiency of the Seq-SS results suggest that ISOs
should not rush to embrace the central stochastic model.
Rather, they should instead carefully consider whether self-
scheduling and virtual bidding in fact already allow markets
to realize most of the potential efficiencies of stochastic
scheduling.
However, the above conclusions presume that the virtual
bidders and self-schedulers can anticipate the probability dis-
tribution of real-time prices based on experience and analysis.
To the degree that price formation (rules for price calculation
and settlement) and market conditions (such as line outages)
are transparent in markets, and to the extent that market con-
ditions are stable, this assumption is more likely to be valid.
Highly complex market software and poorly communicated
or highly unstable market conditions will mean that prices
and their distributions will be difficult for market participants
to forecast. This will lessen or even eliminate the ability of
those participants to correct the inefficiencies of deterministic
market-clearing algorithms used by ISOs.
To provide a more robust estimate of the value of flexible
resources, virtual bidding and self-scheduling, the comparison
of the market models in this paper can be extended to include
an “out-of-sample” simulation, considering many samples of
possible wind realizations. These samples are not necessarily
identical to those wind scenarios considered at the day-ahead
stage. Such out-of-sample analysis would assess the impact of
a fundamental limitation of stochastic programming: that only
a finite set of scenarios can be considered in the optimization
[6].
A further extension of interest would be to consider “imper-
fect” virtual bidders, whose knowledge on probability distri-
bution of real-time prices are not perfect. We hypothesize that
imperfect virtual bidding can still improve market solutions,
as long as the bidders’ distributions are not too far from
actual distributions; on the other hand, large errors in those
distributions might worsen market outcomes. Moreover, in
line with [15] and [16], it could be of interest to analyze
the impacts of virtual bidding on market power mitigation in
oligopolistic electricity markets.
APPENDIX
The KKT conditions associated with Stoch-MP in the
companion paper [1] include three condition sets: i) all con-
straints within problems (1a)-(1g) and balance conditions (1h),
ii) complementarity conditions corresponding to inequality
constraints, and iii) conditions obtained from differentiating
the Lagrangian of each optimization problem (1a)-(1g) with
respect to its primal variables. An example of the members
of the third condition set is given by (5) below, which is
derived from differentiating the Lagrangian of problem (1a)
with respect to DA schedule of slow-start generator i ∈ S ,
i.e., pDAi,t :
Ci − λDA(n:i∈Ψn),t + µi,t − µi,t + µUi,t − µUi,(t+1)
− µDi,t + µDi,(t+1) +
∑
s
[
ρi,t,s − ρi,t,s + ρUi,t,s
−ρUi,(t+1),s − ρDi,t,s + ρDi,(t+1),s
]
= 0 ∀i ∈ S, t. (5)
The KKT conditions associated with the single optimization
problem in Stoch-Opt are identical to those conditions in
Stoch-MP . This proves that Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt are
equivalent. These two models provide benchmarks for evalu-
ating other models, since they determine the efficient DA com-
mitment and energy schedules that minimize expected system
cost. However, Seq differs from the first two models, since
the ISO uses a short-sighted deterministic unit commitment
model in DA market. The KKT conditions associated with
Seq are not identical to those of Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt .
For example, the condition derived from differentiating the
Lagrangian of problem (3a) with respect to pDAi,t is given by
(6), which is different than (5):
Ci − λDA(n:i∈Ψn),t + µi,t − µi,t + µUi,t − µUi,(t+1)
− µDi,t + µDi,(t+1) = 0 ∀i ∈ S, t. (6)
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